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Unemployment insurance, contends Hamermesh,  economic impact of these parameters provides
provides compensation for lost income by  planners with a basis for choice that can guide
requiring individuals or employers, or both, to  them in constructing unemployment insurance
pay taxes into a common fund. It is part of a  programs elsewhere.
general safety net constructed by citizens of
developed countries. It is unique among social  Experience and evidence in developed
insurance programs in that it offers payment for  economies may carry over into developing
an event that is partly preventable and that is not  economics, Hamermesh concludes, but this is
physically painful. Thus, it differs from old-age  unclear. Several characteristics of developing
and disability insurance, from compensation for  economies, particularly the possibility that 2 .1ual
work-related injury and illness, and others. This  ""bor  market exists, are important. This suggests
exposes it to greater criticism from citizens  the need for care in introducing unemployment
opposed to any social insurance, criticism that  insurance programs in these economies.
planners who build unemployment insurance  Hamermesh suggests several lines of research to
programs must takc into account.  answer questions about the validity of the
consumption-insurance goal in developing
Hamermesh analyzes the various goals that  countries, and about appropriate structures of
have been adduced for unemployment insurance  taxes and benefits.
and decides which ones make sense. Sometimes
the supposed goals run counter to what unem-  Hamermesh's discussions of dual labor
ployment insurance programs actually do, but  markets and the size of the modem sector do not
one goal - providing consumption insurancc-  apply to the formcrly planned economies of
is at least partly met by typical unemployment  Eastern Europe, but his discussion of program
insurance programs in developed countries.  parameters and goals may be useful for policy-
makers there who must analyze expectations
Hamermesh lists the parameters of typical  about any unemployment insurance program that
unemployment insurancc programs and their  is proposed.
ranges in industrial countries. Evidence about the
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Bureau  of Economic  Research.  This  paper Is prepared  as part of the Program  of Studies  on Employment
and Labor Market  Issues  conducted by the Education  and Employment  Division  of the Population and
Human  Resources  Departm6nt  of  the World Bank.A.  Introdugiotn  - PuMoses of the DIJcussIon
A major purpose of this essay  to provide an outille  of the scope and nature of
unemployment  Insurance  (UI)  programs In Industrialized  economies. This Includeo: (i) laying  out their
potential  goals, Including  an analysis  of  the rationales  for these  goals; (ii) summarizng  the characteristcs
ofthir  structure;  and (lii) presenting  a summary  of evidence  on the programs' economic  oefcts.  Laying
out th  potential  goals of Ul programs  Is crucial,  since without goals,  we have no basis against  which to
weigh the evidenco  of the programs'  effects. Without  a summary  of program characteristics,  there Is no
basis  for comparing programs or for understanding  the chokes available  to policymakers  elsewhere.
While summaries  of the economic effects  of Ul programs  hava bsen provided  elsewhere,  linking  them
to specific  policy choices is essential  for appreciating  their Impacts  on program goals.
Having  accomplished  these tasks, the second major purpose Is to consider Issues  In
applying  Ul programs  to developing  economies.  The  central  question  Is  the  applicability  of  the Instiutions
of Ul in industrialized  economles,  and the evidence  on their effects,  to this different  context. Following
fromn  this Is a discussion of the research Issues  that should be Investigated  to leam more about this
question. Information  on  expenditures  on Ul as  a percentage  of GDP  Is shown  In  Table 1 for recent  y%rs
for many countries.  Comparisons  across countres In these data are problematic, both because  the
definKions  of what constitute  Ul benefits  differ,  and because  the extent  of unemployment  differs sharply
among  the countries  and over  time. There  is no available  Index  that  shows  the relative  generosity  of each
country9 program under a fixed set of labor-market  condimons.  Sufflice  it to say that we can be sure  that
In most deveioped  economies  Ul benefits  are a very small  fraction of total spending  and as a fraction of
GDP,  they generally  rise as the aggregate  unemployment  rat  Increases.2
Table 1.  Ul Beneffta  as a Percentage of GDP In OECD
Countries, Recent Years
Country  1989  or 1990  Previous  3 Years
Australia  1.07  0.99
Austria  0.11  0.15
Belgium  2.04  °.39
Canada  1.57  1.69
Denmark  3.21  2.95
Finland  0.62  0.79
France  1.27  1.29
Germany  1.14  1.29
Groee  0.46  0.43
Ireland  2.79  3.26
Japan  0.32  0.39
Netherlands  2.30  2.65
New Zealand  1.77  0.97
Norway  1.15  0.64
Portugal  0.32  0.32
Spain  2.33  2.47
Sweden  0.59  0.61
Switzerland  0.14  0.18
Great Britain  0.90  1.17
United States  0.60  0.47
Source: OECD, Emoloyment  Outlook, 1991,  pp. 238-248.
B.  Potentlal Goals of Ul Programs - and Rationales
For Qovernment Intervention
IndividualiBased Goac
Among the goals  that have  been  adduced  for Ul  are two that  can be  viewed  as hndiduai-
based, in the sonse  that they stem from the view that the govemment  can directly improve economic
oAtcomes  at the micro level. To be reasonable  these goals must be based on the belief  that the private
market,  or the individual  agents themselves,  cannot optimize instantaneousiy  or Intertemporally.
The major  motivation  for Ul is the  individual-based  goal of  consumption  stabilization.  This
argument  for Ul as social Insurance  is that without Ul benets  households  will have  insufticnt  savings
to prevent  substantial  welfare  losses  when  a family member  becomes  unemployed. It is  true a fortiori  thatmost  workers  do not know  when  they will  be unemployed.  For  this goal  to be  valid  it must  be  tnre  that
workers  either  estimate  the  probability  of becoming  unemployed  correctly,  but are  so myopic  that  they
do not save  for the eventuality;  or they underestimate  the probability  and thus have inh,  sficient
precautionary  savings.
The  first  possibility,  myopia,  Is  the best  argument  for all forms  of social  insurance.  It is
hard  to believe  that  people  unde%restimate  probabilities  of seasoial  unemployment;  and  even  differences
in  the probabilitles  of cyclical  unemployment  are  likely  to be  fairly  well-known.  It is  easier  to believe  that
workers  simply  are  not  farsighted  enough  to save  sufficiently  for these  eventualities,  especially  for spells
of unemployment  that  are not  seasonal.  That  being  the case,  by forcing  workers  to save  by financing
a Ul program  out of taxes  on their  incomes  or consumption  while  they  are  employed,  the policy  allows
them  to smooth  consumption  and  thus  Increase  their  economic  welfare.  The  Ul  program  becomes  a way
of socially  overcoming  individual  myopia. The second  possibility,  the absence  of good labor-market
information,  does  underlie  the  justification  for many  govemment  activities.  It Is  not  clear,  though,  why  Ul
rather  than  a program  that  disseminates  information  about  prospects  In various  jobs Is  the appropriate
response  to what  seems  to be an  informational  extemality.  This  second  possibility  is a less  acceptable
justification  for this Individual-based  goal.
The  second  individual-based  goal  is that  of employment-smoothing.  From  the  workers
side  the argument  is that  Ul  benefits  can  provide  the  monetary  assistance  that  might  be  complementary
wih search  time and that might  overcome  financial  constraints  that inhibit  search. This is a highly
dubious  argument,  as it assumes  that  overcoming  this  constraint  has  a larger  positive  effe-t  on search
effort  than  the negative  effect  that Ul benefits  induce  on the gains  from  search.  From  the  firm side  the
argument  is that the financing  of Ul can be devised  so that employers  have  Incentives  to respond  to
shocks  in product  demand  by alterng  hours rather  than  employment.  Gi!en a fixed  structure  of Ul
benefits,  that is true; but It misses  the point that has been recognized  In the literature  on Ul and
contracting  (Feldstein,  1976;  Baily,  1977):  Payment  of any  Ul benefits  will  provide  Incentives  for greater
fluctuations  in employment  unless  taxes  that  finance  them  are  assessed  In  an  actuarially  fair  way  on  the4
irms that generat the unemployment.  This goal makes  no economic  sense  per as as an original
justification  for Ul.  It Is worth  considering  only once one has  some  other basic  justification  for the
program.
Socially-Based  Goals
Although  the  Individual-based  goal  of consumption-smoothing  was  the major  motivation
for Ul programs,  since  1950  and until  quite  recently  economists  and others  have  adduced  other,  more
socially-based  goals  for the programs. The oldest  among  these  is macroeconomic  stabilization  -
providing  an automatic  ftiscal  stimulus  to the  economy  by Increasing  purchasing  power  at times  of slack
final  demand.  Even  on its  own  terms  this  narrow  Keynesian  view  requires  that  the net  low of Ul  benefits
and the taxes  that  finance  them  be countercyclical.  That  will always  be true  in programs  financed  by
general  revenues  or ficed-rate  payroll  taxes,  but not necessarily  so if the program  Is  financed  as In the
United  States  (see  below).
Even  assuming  that the net low Is countercyclical,  the question  remains  whether  the
program  can  have  any  effect  on  final  demand.  All  of the concerns  od  the various  macroeconomic  sects
apply  here. These  Include:  (i) The  possibility  that without  compensating  monetary  ease  no real  Impact
AIll  be felt; (ii)  The concem  that the Impact  of the additional  deficit  will be ofset by the effects  of the
accompanying  Increase  In the  debt  on people's  savings;  (iii)  The  worry  that,  to the extent  that  the policy
Is  expected,  any Impacts  will  disappear  as people's  behavior  adjusts  in response;  and no doubt  otheis
too.
Even  beyond  these  fairly  subtle  arguments,  though,  there  Is  a  basic  flaw in this goal.
Admitting  the possible  usefulness  of automatic  fiscal  stabilizers,  why  create  one  in  the complex  way  that
Ul  Is  constructed?  Why  not  create  a simpler  countercyclical  spending  or tax program  not based  on  the
proviion of Income  to unemployed  workers?  Viewed  this  way,  fiscal  stabilization  may  be  a good  reason
for countercyclical  spending;  but it Is not a basic  justification  for Ul.5
Equalizing  Incomes,  or redistributing  purchasing  power,  is  another  justification  for Ul  that
has been cited.  For Ui to accompilsh  this it must be the case  that the Incidence  and duration  of
unempioyment  are  negatively  correlated  with  household  Incomes  and  that  the  taxes  that  finance  benefits
are not too regressive.  There  are no fundamental  Inconsistencles  In this goal,  though  here  too one
wondes  whether  U!  Is  the bust  way  to redistribute  Income.  Ignoring  this,  the  question  becomes  whether
a particular  Ul program  is redistributive.
Using  Ul  to encourage  industrial  restructuring  is a recently  popular  socially-based  goal.
The  argument  here  is politico-economic,  essentially  based  on a compensation  principle: Offer  Ul to
workers  In  Industries  that  had  previously  been  protected  or subsidized  and  that now  face  retrenchment.
Ul benefits  become  a way  of spreading  the otherwise  narrowiy-bome  costs  of the restructuring  that  will
benefit  the entire  economy.  Presumably  this  sharing  reduces  oppositon  to the structural  change.  This
goal  I  intemally  consistent,  though  whether  Ul Is  the best  form  of compensation  to achieve  it Is again
an empirical  question.
C.  The Strucwre of Ul Programs
Viewing  the  programs  as  evolutionary  processes,  this  section  illustrates  the  various  paths
that the poicy can  take,  and gives  examples  from Ul programs  in a variety  of OECD  countries. (The
sources  for the information  are  OECD,  1991;  Blaustehn  and Craig,  1977,  and Reubens,  1989.)  There  are
three  basic  areas  In which  decisions  must  be made:
Coverage  - independent  of the  characteristics  of the  workers  spell  of unemployment,
should  that  worker  be covered  by a Ul program?
Benefits  - how much  will be paid  to the worker  during  each  week  of unemployment,
and  for how  many  weeks?
FinancIng  - who  should  pay  for the benefits,  and how?
Before  even  these  choices  are made,  though,  the national  govemment  must determine  whether  the
program  Is  to be a national  one,  or one In which  the basic  determination  about  benefits  and financing6
Is  made  at a subgovemmental  level.  Whila  most  OECD  countries  have  chosen  national  programs.  In  the
United  States  and Switzerand  most  essential  issues  are  decided  at lower  levels  of govemment.
Coverage
The  issues  here  have  to do chiefly  with  exclusions  relating  to the characteristics  of the
worker  or the employer  that make  it difficult  or politically  or economically  undesirable  even  to consider
the worker  as potentially  eligible  for benefits.  The  potential  areas  for consideration  are:
Industrv  exemptions.  Should  highly  seasonal  Industries,  such  as agriculture,  forestry  or
fisheries,  be  excluded,  presumably  because  coverage  would  either  be  wery  .,  or  diffic0  'it  to administer,
or because  the Industry  Is  not  viewed  as  generating  unemployment?  Examples  of the  first  of these  three
types  of noncoverage  are  the  failure  of most  Ul systems  In the  U.S.  to cover  farm  workers,  or the Swiss
exclusion  of some  hotel and restaurant  workers. The  other  reasons  are illustrated  by the partial  or
complete  noncoverage  of domestic  seivants  in France  and the Netherlands,  and by many  countries'
noncoverage  of govemment  employees.  For  various  reasons  some  countries  either  do  not  cover  railroad
employees  or have  special  programs  for them.
Firm-size  llmits. These  are Imposed  mainly  for administrative  reasons  (though  poliical
pressure  may  also  explain  some  of them). In the  U.S.,  for example,  employers  whose  payrolls  are  below
some  (usually  low) limits  are  excluded  from  their  state's  Ul  system.
Occupational  exempts.  Uke  Industry  exemptions,  these  arise  mainly  because  of the
potential  expense  of coverage  or  because  the occupations  are viewed  as not characterized  by
unemployment.  For example,  Italy  does  not cover  performing  artists  or clergy.
Demooraohic  exemptions.  These  are  usually  imposed  because  the  worker  Is  not  viewed
as having  an entktlement  to regular  participation  In the labor  force, or because  the worker  is not an
employee  in  the  conventional  sense.  Recent  examples  include  noncoverage  of people  above  the  normal
age of retirement  (under  state  pension  plans)  in France,  Norway  and others,  and underage  workers  In7
Italy  and the U.K. Also  excluded  from coverage  in scme  countries  (Germany  is a good example)  are
students,  family  workers  and apprentices.
Benefit.
The  dir-cussion  is  In terms  of the  weekly  benefit  amount  (WBA).  The  policy  choices  flow
logically  In order  from  the determination  of whether  any  bonefits  will be paid,  to the determination  of the
size  of  the  WBA,  the  payment  of  extra  benefits  beyond  the  WBA,  the  numbb  r of weeks  over  which  benefits
can be collected,  alternative  activities  for the unemployed  worker  in conjunction  with the receipt  of
benefits,  and miscellaneous  Issues.
Elicibiliy.  Based  on the conditions  of the worker's  relation  to the employer,  will the
worker  receive  any  benefis? Considerations  Include:
()  Disqualification  for reason  of unemployment.  Most states  in the U.S.  do not pay
benefits  to workers  who leave  their jobs voluntarily,  and none do so to workers  who have been
discharged  for cause  (for  misbehavior  on the  job). In most  other  CCCD  countries  quitters  do qualify  for
benefits,  but  they  are  disqualified  for some  period  of time. Disqualifications  range  from I to 26 weeks,
with  siX  weeks  being  common  (Canada,  Finland,  Ireland  and New  Zealand).
(ii  Work history. The Idea  here Is to determine  whether  the unemployed  worker  is
sufficiently  attached  to the labor  force  to qualify  for Ul benefits.  The  purpose  of looking  at work  history
Is  to avoid  the moral  hazard  of offering  benefits  to someone  who might  enter  the labor  force  for a short
period  of time  In order  to qualify  for benefits  payable  over  a much  longer  period. Within  the Individual's
work  history  the Ul program  needs  to define:
What is the accounting,  or base period over which the worker's
attachment  to the labor  force  Is  gauged?  In many  countries  this  Is one
year (e.g., Canada,  the U.K.,  and most U.S. states),  but In some
continental  European  countries  it is longer.  A longer  base  period,  other8
tings  equal,  offers  the possibility  of  a more stringent  test of  the worker's
labor-force  attachment.
During  the base  period, wore the weeks  worked  andior the  &se-perlod
samings  suffIcient  to qualify the worker for benefits? There are many
choices here, irsluding whether to rest the qualification: a) Solely on
weeks  worked, regardWss  of earnings  per week; b) Solely  on eamings;
or 3) On some com-inatlon o! these.  The range of policies  that have
been chosen varies  tremendously,  and Includes: Minimum number of
weeks worked, for example,  6 months In a 4-year base period In the
U.K.; 20 weeks worked In a  one-year base period, with minimum
eamings per week, In Michigan;  earnings In the highest quarter above
some minimum  level, with total base-period  eamings at least 1.5  times
high-quarter  eamings,  In some U.S. states. All of these altematives  are
different ways of getting at the attachment  of the worker to the labor
force.
Relation  of WBA  to work history. Given  the worker's eligibility,  does the benefit  Increase
with the worker's prior eamings, and if so,  how rapidly?  The first Issue Is whether benefits are
proportional  to eamings,  as In Canada  and most U.S. states  (but see below);  are at least in part a fixed
amount, as in some parts of the Ul programs in Belgium, France,  the Netheriands,  and others; and
whether  there Is a maximum  WBA, as In most U.S.  states?
The more basic Issue  here Is  the determination  of the replacement  rate  - the ratio  of tho
WBA to  arnings.  n other words, how much of the eamings loss does the program seek to make up?
In  the U.S.  50 percent  Is  the typical  gross (excluding  tax considerations)  replacement  rate, but In Canada
it Is 60 percent,  and other countries  that set benefits  proportional  to eamings replace  anywhor  from 60
to 80 percent under the regular  phase of Ul benefts.  Table 2 shows  the gross replacement  rate for an
eligible  unmarried  worker  who experiences  a full year of unemployment  during a calendar  year. The very9
how  feplacr  ient rates  In some  countries resut from wviuming  a full year of unemployment  where  the Ul
system  lmimb  the payment  of benefts to less than a year.
Extrauloffets !o the WBA. The  qu3stions here revolve  around demogmphle  reasons  for
supplementing  the WBA, taxation of the WBA and oftets  for other eam'r.gs.
(i) Dependents'  beneits.  A few U.S. states and parts of the Ul programs in Europe,
partcularly wher  benefs are a ftxed  amount, offer  extra  beneftts  to unemployed  workers based  on their
fmily  status. The amount can vary with the employment  status of the spouse,  and addlt!onal  benefits
can be offered  n  dependent  children  are present. The Issue  here Is  whether  the program Is  to be viewed
as trsting  people tl-  sam.e  based on their labor-force  behavior,  implying  dependents' benefits  are not
warranted, or based on the severity  of the Impact on consumption  of a loss of oamings.
(Ii)  Taxation  of benefits. In most OECD  countrles  benefits  are fully  taxable,  but In  Greece,
Irelknd,  Japan and Spa  they are not. Slnce  households'  tax liabilities  will differ  even f the unemployed
workers  who generate  the Ul benefits  have had  the same  work history,  taxation  of benefits  chanUes  their
Impact  differently  among households. This  means  that the focus should  always be on net replacement
ates,  the ratios of after-tax  Ul benefits  to after-tax  eamings  losses.
(Ili)  Eamings  tests. Is  there a reduction  in benets  If the Ul recipient  has some eamings
during the week beneMs  are received? One possibiliy Is complote  disqualification  If the worker eams
anything. Others  include complex  scales  relating  the reduction  to the amount earned. In the U.S.  some
states reduce banefits  by a (usually  large)  fraction for each dollar eamed, while others reduce benefits
by discrete  amounts  when eamings  cross  various  thresholds. The Issue  here is whether  the worker has
suffered a  loss of eamings large enough to justify the payment  of benefits that will help maintain  the
household's  consumption.
Duration  of bonefits. The major  Issue  Is when  benefts will become  payable  and how  long
they  ill romain  payable. The  Issue  of potential  duration  - the maximum  number  of weeks  during  which
the WBA  can be received  - is, along with the determination  of the WBA, the central choice to be made
In any Ul program.  In most countries those workers whose perods  of unemployment  exceed the10
potential duration of  benefts  - who have exhausted their entitlement - receive some kind of
govemmental  support; but the level  of that support Is usually  lower. Thus potential  duration  does affect
the total amount of earnigs  replaced  during many spells of unemployment. Potential  duration varies
from as low as 26 weeks or less  In most states  In the U.S.,  to 30 weeks  in Japan to a year or more in
many  European  countries. In  those countries,  such  as Spain,  where  the rate of  flow out of unemployment
Is very low, Ul laws generally  specify  a longer potntial  duration.












New Zealand  27
Spain  62
Sweden  90
United Kingdom  16
United States  25
Source: OECD, EmDlovment  Outlook, 1991,  p. 233.
Within  the general  choice  of potential  duration, is that  duration  variable  or fixed,  and what
determines how potential duration varies?  In most U.S. states potential duration Is variable, and Is
determined by considerations  of work history  similar  to those that determine  the WBA.
Is there a second-tier Ul program that becomes effective after regular benefts are
exhausted? For example,  Austria  and Ireland  offer unemployment  assistance  at lower leveis  of support
to very long-term unemployed workers. These programs  are not, strictly speaking, Ul programs, but11
rather  are  more  reflections  of general  income-support  policy. None  of the subsequent  discussion  deals
with  them. But  any  newly-constructed  Ul  policy  should  be  structured  In  such  a way  that  it dovetails  easily
with  existing  or proposed  second-tier  programs.
Is there  a waiting  period  at the start  of a compensable  period  of unemployment  during
which  no  benefits  are  paid?  This  Is  the equivalent  of a deductible  amount  in  a private  insurance  program.
The  argument  for this institution  is partly  to avoid  the necessity  of incurring  the administrative  cost of
compensating  very  short  spells  that probably  do not  generate  any  economic  hardship,  partly  to provide
incentives  for workers  and employers  not to generate  short  spells. A one-week  waiting  period  Is  most
common  in the U.S.,  but 10 states  require  no waiting  period,  as do nearly  half  of the other OECD
countries,  Including  France  and Germany.
Requirements  to maintain  WBA. Because  Ul programs  seek  to maintain  consumption
among unemployed  workers while at  the same time encouraging,  or  at  least minimizing  the
discouragement  to employment,  a variety  of provisions  have  been  and  can  be imposed  to accomplish
this. The  main  issue  is whether  the Ul recipient  is available  for work. The  decisions  involve:
(i) Search  requirements.  What  constitutes  effective  search?  The  items  of concem  here
are:  job contacts  and suitable  work. How  much  effort  is the recipient  required  to make,  in terms  of
contacting  employers  and  demonstrating  that  the  contacts  have  been  made?  What  constitutes  sufficient
proof  of the contacts,  and  who  verifies  them? In the U.S.  many  states  require  that  the recipient  present
lists  of contacts  actually  made.  An  unemployed  bricklayer  can  draw  benefits  until  exhaustion  by insisting
that  he  will  only  take  work  as a bricklayer.  Is  there  some  point  during  the  spell  of unemployment  at which
the  definition  of wsuitable"  becomes  broader,  as in Denmark,  the  U.K.  and elsewhere?  The  argument  for
this  broadening  is  that  the  length  of the  spell  itself  demonstrates  that  no  work  is  available  in  the recipient's
previous  occupation,  so  that  the  value  of any  occupation-specffic  skills  is  greatly  diminished.  That  justffies
requiring  him  or her  to accept  a job in another  occupation.
(ii) Training  requirements.  In addition  to requiring  that the worker  seek  jobs under  a
broader  definition  of suitable  work  after  some  duration  of unemployment,  some  programs  require  the12
worker  to participate  in a subsidized  or public  training  or job creation  program.  For example,  Denmark
usually  requires  entry  Into  a training  program  after  12  months  of unemployment.  Clearly,  unless  there
are  worthwhile  training  opportunities  available,  this requirement  just becomes  a way  of extending  the
payment  of Ul benefits.
(iii Bonuses  and cash-outs.  Several  states  in the U.S.  have  offered  Ul recipients  lump-
sum  bonuses  if they  leave  the Ul  rolls  before  some  (usually  short)  period  of unemployment  is completed.
The  idea  here  Is  to cash  out  part  of the Ul  entitlement  and  thus  provide  an incentive  to workers  to accept
jobs more  quickly.
Miscellaneous  Issues.  A variety  of miscellaneous  Issues  involving  benefits  also  needs  to
be  or can  be considered  in constructing  a Ul program.  These  have  to do  with  the  general  administrative
conditions  characterizing  the program  and are  not  specific  to the particular  spell  of unemployment  that
is potentially  compensable.  Though  the first  two are  seemingly  minor,  in fact  the choices  made  about
them  affect  how well  the program  can meet  its goals  and avoid  negative  secondary  effects.
(i) Frequency  of payment. Though  many  of the issues  in benefits  revolve  around
determining  the weekly  benefit  amount,  it Is not necessary  that  the payments  be made  weekly. Several
states  In  the U.S.  have  experimented  with  biweekly  payments  as a way  to reduce  administrative  costs.
The  potential  problem  is that lower-frequency  payments  may  detract  from  the goal of maintaining  the
unemployed  household's  consumption  if recipients  are  unable  to budget  well  in  the  face  of their  reduced
Incomes.
(I) Method  of payment.  Administrative  costs  are reduced  If Ul benefits  can be  paid by
check  or by  bank  transfer  without  any  contacts  between  the  recipient  and  the  program  agency.  Programs
vary  greatly  as to whether  they  require  the recipient  to report  In person.  France  and  the Netherlands  do
not require  regular  reporting,  while  Australia,  Japan,  Sweden  and many  others  do.  The  time  interval
between  visits  varies  among  programs  from  as little  as 1 week  up to 3 months. The  cost of a longer
Interval  (or  of no reporting)  Is  the lost  ability  to determine  the quality  of the  recipient's  job-search  efforts
and  to aid In matching  the recipient  to a job vacancy.13
(ii) Triggered  benefits.  Are  there  labor-market  triggers that  alter  the WBA  or potential
duration  depending  on the state of the labor market? In the U.S.,  for example,  there is a national
program  that lengthens  maximum  potential  duration  when  the state  and/or  the national  labor  market
exhbit higher  unemployment.  The  arguments  in favor  of these  triggers  are: a) When  the labor  market
is looser,  the expected  duration  of a worker's  spell  of unemployment  is greater. That increases  the
likelihood  that unemployment  imposes  some  hardship,  and  justifies  higher  weekly  benefits  and/or  longer
potential  duration;  b) With higher  unemployment  the likelihood  that the worker's  skills depreciate
increases,  justifying  greater  compensation  to replace  this loss.
Financlng
This  Subsection  considers  the options  on financing  separately  from  those  on coverage
and benefits. In terms of the evolution  of the program,  though,  the choices  are not separable. Ul
programs  that  rely  on  different  methods  of  financing  generate  different  structures  of benefits,  because  the
poliical pressures  to limi costs  come  from  different  sources.  The  options  are  listed  in a hierarchy  from
basic  to Increasingly  specialized.
Should  the program  be public or private? This seems  like a siliy option, since all
programs  have  public  involvement.  But  the  Swedish  program,  though  under  public  supervision,  has  Ul
funds  administered  by trade  unions  (a  real  possibility  In  a country  that is 90  percent  unionized).  Before
the British  Ul program  was  Introduced  in 1911,  several  private  firms  offered  Ul as  an Insurance  option.
Wih the  current  world-wide  pressures  for privatization,  similar  programs  have  been  proposed  In  the  U.K.
and the U.S. The  early  British  companies  went  bankrupt,  and the classic  argument  in favor  of social
Insurance  for unemployment  is  that  private  carriers  cannot  insure  against  the  common  risk  of  a nationwide
recession.  A compulsory  privately-operated  program,  with  very  large  carriers  that  have  sufficient  reserves
or borrowing  capacity  to weather  a recession,  might  not have  such  problems.
If the unusual  route  of a private  program  is chosen,  would  it be  compulsory  or  voluntary?
Would it be administered  through  indidual  Obeneficial  fundse  by trade unions,  or would  there be14
coverge by private  insurance  carriers? How much  govemment  regulation  of the provisions  of the
program  would  be Imposed,  including  controls  over  all those  Issues  In benefts  that were  discussed  In
the last  Subsection?
Assuming  the program  will be public,  will it be financed  out of general  revenues  or
earmarked  taxes?  An earmarked  tax has  the  virtue  that it creates  In  the public  mind  the  notion  of a self-
financing  program. The  existence  of a Ul fund both  limits  excesses  and establishes  that  the program
differs  from  a  welfareP-type  income  tranisfer.  Some  countries  - Austria,  Canada,  Denmark  and others  -
- combine  the  approaches  by using  general  revenues  to finance  any  delicts In  the Ul  fund  when  benefit
outflows  exceed  reserves.
If  an  earmarked  tax  is  used,  policy-maker  must  determine  which  among  the  three  parties
- govemment,  employers  and  employees  - are  taxed  to finance  the  fund,  and how  much  each  should
pay.
Taxing  employers  on their  payroll  Is done In every  OECD  program  except  Sweden's
(essentially  private)  program  and  Switzerland's  cantonal-based  programs.  In most  countries  the  burden
is shared  between  employers  and employees,  with  employers  paying  a greater  share  of taxes  In most
countries  (paying  100  percent  of costs  in most  U.S.  states  and Italy).  Clearly,  the incidence  of the  tax  -
its eventual  burden  - will not depend  on  which  party  in  these  countries  is assessed  the  tax. Participants'
attitudes  about  the program  do depend  on this,  though. Assessing  the tax on the employer  heightens
employer  groups'  concems  about  lowering  benefi costs  and controlling  the provisions  that generate
them. Assessing  the  tax In  part  on the  employee  makes  workers  feel  that Ul  benefits  are  something  they
have  paid  for.  The  cost rate  - the ratio  of taxes  to payroll  - Is tied through  what can be two-way
causality  to the  generosity  of the  program's  benefit  provisions.  This  means  that  In  constructing  a program
the tax rate  that is set  to some  extent  determines  the eventual  cost rate.
If an earmarked  payroll  tax is used,  the first  major  Issue  is how  the tax rate  should  vary
with a workers payroll  cost. The tax can be flat-rate  or not.  Most countries,  both those  that tax
employers  and workers,  and those  that  tax just one of the parties,  assess  flat-rate  taxes;  but in South15
Africa  the tax rato explicitly  varies  Inversely  with a worker's  earnings. Though  the tax is almost
everywhere  flat-rate,  in most countries  (but not In Italy  and Japan)  there  Is a tax base  - a maximum
weekly,  monthly  or annual  earnings  beyond  which  no tax on the worker's  payroll  cost,  or his or her
eamings,  Is  assessed.  Umiting  the  tax base  generates  complex  economic  effects  (see  the next  Section).
The  main  choices  are:
What  is the relationship  between  the tax base  and the average  wage?
Setting a  higher base (with a flat-rate  tax) makes financing less
progressive.  The choice  of a tax base  also can interact  with  choices
about  a maximum  WBA,  as there  may  be political  pressure  to limit  the
latter  based  on limitations  on the  tax base. Tied  to this Is whether  and
how to allow  the  tax base  to change  as nominal  wages  increase.
Over  what  accounting  period  Is  the tax base  calculated?  Choosing  a
longer (annuai) period over which to  calculate  the base creates
incentives  for employers  to alter  turnover,  since  there Is some  point
during the year for at least  some  jobs when the incumbents  cease
generating  tax liabilities  for the employer.
The  second  issue  in  an  earmarked  payroll  tax  is whether  the  tax  on employers  should  be
linked  to the  amount  of benefits  their  unemployed  workers  have  collected  in  the past  - whether  the  tax
should  be experience-rated  or not. Only  In the United  States  is the payroll  tax experience-rated.  The
main  argument  In favor  of experience-rating  Is that it helps  the program  simulate  a private  insurance
program  more  closely  by making  employers  pay  for the unemployment  that they and their  workers
"generate." Also,  It provides  employers  with  incentives  to reduce  the Instability  of employment  in their
establishments.  If an  experience-rated  tax structure  is chosen,  a variety  of choices  must  be made.
Most  important,  what  benefits  are  to be  charged  against  the  employer's  experience-rated
account?  Should  a wnrker's  entire  entitlement  be  charged,  or  just  the initial  part  (under  the assumption
that  the employer  Is  no longer  responsible  for the worker's  unemployment  if the worker  has  not  found16
a job after many  weeks)? This question  has been resolved  in the U.S.  by making  employers  fully
responsible  for the  first  26  weeks  of benefts,  and  parlty  responsible  for  the  next  13  weeks  (if  such  benefits
are payable).  Should  benefits  for short-tern  workers  who qualify  for Ul based  on prior base-period
employment  be charged  to the firm from which  they  are laid off, or to their  previous  employer?  The
standard  rule  is to charge  the  previous  employer,  but  that means  that  the  tax  cost  that Is  produced  Is  not
linked  to the decision  that generated  the spell  of unemployment.
How  wide is the range  of tax rates  to which  the employer  is subject? The  wider  the
range,  the more  closely  each employer  can be made  to finance  the benefits  collected  by his ur her
employees,  and  presumably  the  tax  can  accomplish  more  employment-smoothing.  (With  no  experience-
rting, no such  charging  is possible.)
Subsumed  in  this  Issue  are  choices  about  minimum  and maximum  tax rates. In  the U.S.
the maximum  tax rate  to which  employers  may  be subject  must  now be at least  5.4 percent  (on  a tax
base  that is less  than  half  the average  wage).
A choice must be made about the reserve  method on which to base employers'
experience-rated  taxes. The  most  common  method  in  the  U.S.,  the  reserve-ratio  method,  bases  the  tax
rate  on the ratio  of accumulated  reserves  In the employer's  account  to the payroll.
The  range  of experience-rated  tax  rates  may  differ  depending  on  labor-market  conditions  -
- there  may  be multiple  tax schedules.  The  justification  is that a higher  schedule  of rates  may  be an
appropriate  way of socializing  the co_ts of the addAlonal  Ul benefits  that are generated  when
unemployment  rises.  The  counterargument  Is  that  this  departs  from  the purpose  of experience-rating  by
reducing  burdens  on  the employer  in whose  firm  the additional  unemployment  originates.
Because  of limits  on  the  range  of tax  rates,  some  employers  will  have  negative  balances
In their  accounts. Should  Interest  be charged  on these  negative  balances,  and,  If so, at what  Interest
rate?  To be actuarially  fair  Interest  should  be  charged  at a rate  equal  to the market  rate  on equally  risky
assets  (perhaps  a short-term  bond  rate). In practice,  negative-balance  accounts  are  not assessed  any
interest  charges.17
In an experience-rated  system  choices  must  also  be made  about  the  accounting  period
over  which  past benefit  payments  can  be related  to the current  tax rate. A longer  accounting  period
allows  for to  rapid  adjustment  of tax  rates  in response  to changes  In  the  employers  benefit  experience.
This has  the posiive offect  of reducing  shocks  to employers'  labor  costs,  but the negative  effect  of
lessening  the Incentives  that  the program  can  provide  to mitigate  employment  fluctuations.
D. Evidence  on the Economic  Effects
There  have  been  masses  of empirical  evidence  on  the  economic  impact  of Ul  programs;
and  the  overwhelming  majority  of  these  empirical  studies  have  been  done  in  the  past  15  years.  However,
whA.  they have  focussed  our  knowledge  on a few  of the issues  discussed  here,  on many  others  there
is so little  empirical  analysis,  or what  exists  is so poorly  done,  that economic  theory  provides  the sole
guide  to the potential  effects  of the programs.  In a few  cases  the  discussion  refers  to individual  studies
whose  results  specifically  imply  a conclusion.  In most,  though,  it relies  on the available  syntheses  of
empirical  work  to draw  the conclusions.
This  Section  Is  organized  by linking  the programs'  provisions  that  were  detailed  In  the  last
Section  to the economic  questinns  that  underlie  the  goals  outlined  in Section  B. Some  of the questions
cut across  the various  provisions,  so that discussions  of them  rely  on evidence  on the effect  of several
provisions  at once. Thorough  discussions  of some  of these  cross-cutting  issues  are In Hamermesh
(1977),  Gustman  (1982)  and Topel  (1990).
Benefts
The  major  economic  questlon  about  benefits,  and  about  Ul  programs  more  generally,  is
how  greater  generosity  of the  program  affects  unemployment.  This  is linked  to the Individual-b*ased  goal
of employment-smoothing  and the socially-based  goal of reducing  macroeconomic  fluctuations.  The
question  has  been  answered  In so  many  ways,  and  relates  to such  a variety  of provisions  of Ul  programs,
that this Subsection  discusses  a number  of different  aspects  of the evidence  on the IndMdually-based18
goal. The  massive  evidence  on this issue  has  been  summarized  by BJorklund  and Holmiund  (1988),
Bwutss  (1990),  Cox  and Oaxaca  (1990),  and Atkinson  and Micklewright  (1991).  The  evidence  on the
socially-based  goal Is left until a later  Subsection.  Much  of the discussion  relies  on the distinction
between  the duration  and Incidence  of unemploymient  (measured  in percent  of the labor  force),  which
are  linked  to the unemployment  rate  (measured  in percent)  by the identity:
unemployment  rate . 100 x  (Incidence  x Dura4d
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What  is the impact  of a hihher  net replacement  rate  on  the duration  of unemDloRment?
This  has  been  the most  heavily-researched  question  in Ul. There  are  two related  theoretical  bases  for
inferring  that  there  would  be  an effect. The  first  stems  from search  theory. A higher  replacement  rate
raises  the relative  cost  of spending  additional  time searching  for work  (and  remaining  unemployed).  It
allows  the Ul  recipient  to be  more  choosy  in looking  for work. If search  effort  per  week  (search  intensity)
is unaffected  by additional  Ul benelits,  any positive  effect  on unemployment  duration  will a!so be
accompanied  by  a positive  effect  on the  post-unemployment  wage.  Search  theory  also  predicts  that  the
effect  of additional  benefits  is smaller  when  there  is more  unemployment:  Because  the competition  for
the few job openings  makes  the probability  of successful  search  so low, less  search  is taking  place.
Offering  higher  benefits  will  not reduce  search  as much  as at other  times,  because  there  Is  little  scope
for reducing  search  any  further.  Whether  search  intensity  is unaffected  by  benefits,  Is  Increased  because
benefits  provide  the means  to search  more  efficiently  (see  Section  B) or Is reduced,  and how greater
replacement  through  Ul affects  subsequent  wages,  are empirical  questions  that should  be subsumed
under  the general  question  of the effects  on duration.
The  altemative  way  of viewing  higher  replacement  is in  the  context  of choices  about  labor
supply.  A higher  WBA  decreases  the net  retums  to working.  So  long  as  we  believe  labor  supply  curves
are  upward-sloping  (and  the  evidence  suggests  that  Is  especially  so among  lower-wage  workers  who  are
more  likely  to be UI recipients),  this means  the program  will reduce  recipients'  work  effort  by Increasing19
the number  of weeks  they  remain  unemployed  once a spell  of unemployment  has  begun. This  is the
same  prediction  as offered  by  search  theory;  but  here  there  are  no  implications  about  the  effects  of higher
replacement  on post-unemployment  wages  or on how disincentives  change  as labor-market-wide
unemployment  changes.
Empirical  research  on  this  issue  has  proceeded  for  the  U.S.,  the  U.K.,  Sweden,  Germany,
Canada,  Spain  and other  countries  too.  At this point  the evidence  Is  completely  c' ar  that higher  net
replacement  increases  the duration  of spells  of unemployment.  Obviously  there  Is  substantial  variation
among  the  estimates  of the magnitude  of the effect.  A good consensus  estimate,  though,  Is  that  each
additlonal  10-percent  Increase  In the net replacement  rate  raises  duration  by 6 percent.  As the  theory
of job search  predicts,  this disincentive  effect  diminishes  as the duration  of a spell  of unemployment
Increases.
This  conclusion  clearly  implies  that  higher  replacement  reduces  search  intensity.  (Devine
and Kiefer,  1991,  present  the evidence  on replacement  and  duration  in the  context  of search  behavior.)
The  direct  evidence  on this  issue  (e.g.,  Barron  and Mellow,  1979)  demonstrates  this: People  receMng
a hlgher  WBA,  other  things  equal,  spend  fewer  hours  per  week  searching.  The  evidence  on  the Impact
on post-unemployment  wages  Is less  clear,  but there  Is little  indication  of any positive  effect. Taken
together,  the  evidence  strongly  suggests  that  recipients  use  a higher  WBA  to increase  the  duration  of their
spells  of unemployment,  that  search  Intensity  Is  reduced,  but  that  total search  effort  during  the (longe)
spell  of unemployment  is unchanged.  For  a given  incidence  of unemployment,  a higher  WBA  Increases
the unemployment  rate  because  it lengthens  duration.  The  evidence  on  this  effect  suggests  Ul  operates
counter  to its goal  of employment  stabilization.
What  Is  the  effect  of areater  potential  duration  on  the  duration  of spells  of unemrlovmen1?
With  the first  question,  this one  exhausts  the issue  of the Impact  of Ul  on unemployment  duration.  The
impact  of greater  potential  duration  can  also  be  explained  both  by  search  and  by labor-supply  behavior.
An additional  week  of benefits  changes  the cost of search  for that week. Witi an additional  week  of
potential  duration,  the  point  at  which  the costs  of search  drop  because  Ul  benefits  are  no  longer  available20
changes.  This suggests  that we should  observe  a large  fraction  of the unemployed  taking  jobs very
shortly  after  they  exhaust  benefits,  and  very  few  taking  jobs  just  prior  to exhaustion.  Viewed  In  the  context
of labor supply,  an increase  in potential  duration (at  a fixed  WBA)  is equivalent to an increase  in uneamed
Income.  Since  we  assume  people  value  leisure,  a higher  potential  duration  reduces  the supply  of labor
and Increases  actual  duraton.
Two  approaches  have  been  used  to examine  this question.  The  first,  and much  more
widesproad,  simply  compares  the duration  of spells  among  a group  of unemployed  workers  or across
indivduals  to the potential  duration  of benefits.  (These  studies  are  most  convincing  when  dierences in
potential  duration  arise from differences  In laws across  jurisdictions,  or from legislated  changes  in
potential  duration.)  The  evidence  generally  supports  the prediction  that  longer  potential  duraton  results
in longer  spells,  other  things  equal. More  recently,  several  studies  (e.g.,  Meyer,  1990)  have  examined
the  fractlon  of unemployed  workers  whose  speils  have  lasted  t weeks  who  find  jobs during  week  t+ 1 (the
hazard  rato  of leaving  unemployment).  The hazard  rate  drops sharply  during  the last  few weeks  of
eligibility,  and rises  sharply  immediately  after  benefits  are  exhausted.
Taken  together,  the evidence  suggests  that  Increasing  potential  duration  does  Increase
the  average  duration  of spells  of unemployment.  Unlike  in  the answer  to the first  question,  though,  no
consensus  Is  possible  about  the size  of the  effect.  All  we  can  be sure  of Is  that longer  potential  duration
increases  average  duration,  and  thus  the average  rate  of unemployment.  Here  too, a more  generous  Ul
program  generates  impacts  counter  to the goal  of stabilizing  employment.
An  Important  policy  question  is how  the  impact  of a 1-week  increase  in potential  duratlon
on the unemployment  rate  varies  with  existing  rules  on potential  duration. On one level  the answer  is
nearly  clear  Since  the number  of unemployed  workers  decreases  steadily  as duration  Increases,  t Is
almost  certain  that  the effect  is larger  If potential  duration  Is  short. A more  subtle  question  is how a 1-
week  Increase  In potential  duration  affects  the hazard  rate  as potential  duration  Increases.  No  theory
yields  unambiguous  predictions  on this  question,  and there  Is no evidence  on it.21
How does  a more  generous UI system  affete  the Incidence  of unemolovment?  Define
generosity  as weaker oiigibility  critoria,  higher  net replacement  and a longer  potential  duration. The
question Is  how these affect the probability  of moving  fom employment  to unemployment.
Assumethat  workers  know  that some businesses, and the  industries  they  operate  In,  have
more  variablb  demand.  That  being  the  case,  In  the  absence  of a Ul  program, these  firms  will  have  to pay
a wage  premium  to attract  otherwise  equally  capable  workers  to this more  risky  activity.  Consider  what
happens when  a Ul program  is Instituted  (and  is financed by goneral  revenues  or by a payroll  tax on
employers  or employees  that is not experience-rated).  Employers  can  attract  equally  qualified  workers
with  lower  wage  rates  than before,  because  Ul  benefits  now  compensate  for part  of the potential  loss  of
Income  stemming  from  the risk unemployment.  This  Induces  the employer  to reduce  employment  by
more  when  product  demand  drops,  because  the  govemment  (or  all workers,  or all firms)  now  bears  the
cost of the decision. This  Is especially  so In the riskiest  businesses,  so the program  leads  to their
expansion  as their costs,  and eventually  the prices  of their  products,  are cut relative  to those  of the
average  business. An imperfectly  experience-rated  Ul program  thus also cross-subsidizes  risky
businesses  and industries,  leading  to their  expansion  and to an increase  In the average  incidence  of
unemployment  among  labor-force  participants.  The  more  generous  benefits  are  under  such  a program,
the greater  the Impact  on the incidence  of unemployment.
Much  of the  evidence  on  the  Impact  of Ul  programs  looks  at  the  effects  of more  generous
benefits  on  the unemployment  rate  In  an area  or at its  variation  over  time  In an  economy.  Other  studies
examine  the probability  that a worker  Is unemployed  during  a particular  survey  week. Both of these
essentially  consider  the impact  on both duration  and Incidence  together. A very  few studies  use
retrospective  data to examine  the Impact  of higher  benefits  on the probability  that a worker  was
unemployed  during  some  time  Interval  (usually  the previous  calendar  year). The  first  group  of studies
generally  shows  the  unemployment-increasing  effects  of higher  benefits,  while  the latter  group  Indicates
that the Incidence  of unemployment  Is greater  among  otherwvise  Identical  workers  who  are eligible  for22
higher benefits. Taken  together, the results show that, Independent  of its impact on duration, a more
generous structure  of benefits  increases  the incidence  of unemployment  as well.
How does a more aenerous  Ul oroaram affect emolovment? The Issue Is what is the
effect of Ul on the total amount of goods and services  produced In the market (GDP),  since in the long
run worker-hours are combined with other productive Inputs (that It makes sense to assume stay
unchanged).
The three previous  questions  dealt with Impacts  on the unemployment  rate. For  a fixed
labor supply  the answers  to them Imply  that more generous  benefits  reduce  employment  and thus GDP.
But It is incorrect  to assume  that the supply of labor  does not change  when beneffts  Increase  or eligibility
Is  eased. Instead,  as with any other nir*rance program,  when  the risk Is compensated  more  generously,
the Insured  will undertake  more of the risky activity. In this case the risky activity  Is participation  in the
labor  force, and the risk Is that participation  will include weeks  of unemployment. Put differently,  more
generous  I makes  participation  relatively  more attractive  by raising  the expected  retums to time spent
In  the labor force.
There  has been  a small amount of research  on this issue, and it generally  supports the
theoretical  predictions. A more  generous  benefit  structure,  especially  less  stringent  qualifying  restrictions,
Induces  more participation  and hence  more employment,  other  things equal. To some extent  this offsets
the impacts noted In the answers  to Questions  I through 3, though the evidence  suggests  the offset Is
only  partial. Because  those workers  induced  to participate  by more generous  Ul programs  tend to have
higher  probabilities  of becoming  unemployed,  the change in  the composition  of the labor  force ra:ses  the
unemployment  rate.
Financing
Much less empirical  research  has been produced  on the economic effects  of alternative
methods  of financing Ul than on those of benefits. Except  for empirical  studies  of various  provisions  of
experience  rating  In the United  States  (see  the summary  by Hamermesh,  1990),  the results  that are used23
to infer  the impact  of financing  st3m from more  general  studies  of labor-market  issues. The major
questions  about  financing  are  dealt  with  In order  from  general  to specific.
Who  really  Pavs for Ul benefits?  This  is a standard  Issue  of tax Incidence,  or, viewed
more  generally,  of the Incidence  of a govemment  program.  I the  method  of financing  Is  a payroll  tax  that
Is not experience-rated  (as  In all countries  but  the U.S.)  the answer  to the questhn  Is  the same  as to
questions  about  the Incidence  of payroll  taxes  generally.  The  effect  depends  on thne  elasticity  of labor
supply  to the market: If it Is  completely  inelastic,  the  entire  impact  of the  payrli1  tax Is  to reduce  wages
(and  leave  the net  cost of labor,  and thus  employment,  unchanged).
In an  experience-rated  system  the  Issue  is much  more  complex,  and  there  are  no simple
theoretical  Inferences  to be drawn. Assume  that,  as in a non-rated  system,  the burden  of the tax Is
entirely  on labor. Is the burden  disproportionately  on labor  in those  firms  that use  the system  more
heavily?  Indeed,  In the extreme,  Is a perfectly  experience-rated  systein  neutral,  in the sense  that the
market  fully  adjusts  so that  each  dollar  of expected  benefits  is  financed  by higher  expected  tax rates  that
in  tum generate  reductions  in  expected  wages  of one  dollar?  This  kind  of supemeutrality  is possible,  but
only  In  a perfectly  experience-rated  system,  and  only  If  one  believes  that markets  are  that  efficlent.  In an
imperfectly  rated  system,  the nonrated  part  of the tax  will  be bone as  a general  payroll  tax;  but will  the
rated  part be adjusted  fully  and differentially  across  firms  and across  workers  depending  on correct
expectations  of their  likelihood  of generating  Ul costs?
lgnoring  Issues  of experience-rating,  the empirical  literature  on the Incidence  of payroll
taxes  is inconclusive  on  this  question.  While  some  specific  studies  suggest  the  payroll  tax burden  is not
entirely  bome by labor,  the huge  general  lterature  on labor  supply  suggests  that for most  groups  it is
almost  completely  inelastlc.  This  Implies  that a nonrated  payroll  tax in industrialized  countries  will  be
bome  by workers  generally.  There  is no  empirical  evidence  on whether  an experience-ated  tax affects
wages  differentially  across  firms  that  differ  in  their  propensity  to lay  off  workers;  and  there  Is  no  evidence
on whether  a partly  or fully  experience-rated  Ul tax  affects  the wages  of workers  within  a particular  firm
differentially  depending  on dffferences  in the likelihood  of their  being  laid  off (and  generating  higher  Ul24
tax costs).  At this  point  the  -o,  nclusion  about  the  payroll  tax  that finances  Ul benefts  In developed
economis is that it Is probably  bome by labor  In the form  of lower  wage  rates. We  cannot  create  a
program  of Ul benefits  and  view  it as a transfer  of Income  from  firms  to workers.
How  does  a limit  on  the tax  base  affoct  emlovment and  wanes?  The  Issue  here  is the
differeMntial  Impact  of the limit  on worker whose  labor  cosb diffWr.  For  a given  tax rate  a lower  tax base
raises  the  relative  cost  of employing  low-wage  workers.  Wih a nonrated  tax,  this  means  that  either  wages
adjust,  reducing  the relative  take-home  pay  of lowwage  workers  (and  keeping  the  relative  not  cost  to the
employer  constant);  employment  adjusts,  so  that  the ratio  of employment  of more-  to less-skilled  workers
economy-wide  Increases,  implying  an increase  in the nonemployment  of low-skilled  workers;  or some
combination  of both,  implying  that  there  Is  at least  some  decrease  In the relative  earnings  of low-skilled
workers. The empiical issue  Is how large  the change will  be, which depends  on the substitutability  of
woers  by skill.
In an experience-rated  system  the Issue  is more  complex,  as i depends  on employers'
ability  to recognize  relationships  between  the  amount  of Ul  costs  that  a group  of workers  generates  and
their  average  wage  level.  If this  Is  fully  recognized,  we  get  the suporneutrality  resuit  that  the  program  has
no impact  on relative  employment  (or nonemployment)  by skill group. Absent  this recognition,  an
experience-rated  system  will  produce  the  same  relative  decline  in the position  of low-skilled  (low-wage)
workers  as a nonrated  system.
As with  Question  1, there  is no specific  evidence  from  Ul systems.  There  is, though,  a
growing  literature  on substutibon  of workers  by skill  class,  Including  disaggregations  of the labor  force
that are  correlated  with wage  level  (Hamermosh,  1993,  Chapter  3). The clear  suggestion  from  these
studIs Is that employers  do substitute  between  skill  groups  as the relative  costs  of employing  them
change.  The  empirical  work  Is  too diverse  to allow  any  conclusion  about  how  great  this  substitution  is;
but it is surely  sufticient  to allow  us to conclude  that,  unless  the Ul  tax Is perfectly  experience-rated  and
employers  can  essentially  assign  Ul  costs  to groups  of workers,  a lower  llmit  on the  tax base  results  In
lower  empicyment  and/or  lower  wages  of less-skilled  workers.25
What  are  the  effects  on  emplovment  and  unemployment  of choosing  an  exDerience-rated
over  a nonrated  financina  scheme  for Ul benefits?  All the theoretical  argurrents  show  that, within  a
particular  system  of benefits,  and  v ith  the  behavior  of a particular  labor  force,  choosing  experience-rated
payroll  taxes  generates  lower  layoff  unemployment,  and higher  employment  on average,  than  does  a
nonrated  system. The argument  was suggested  above.  Charging  employers  for the Ul benefits
genorated  from  their  firms  allows  the  price  of labor  that  they  face  to reflect  all costs, both  wages  and Ul
benefit  costs. This  Induces  firms  that  produce  greater  costs  to the Ul system  to contract  relatively,  and
it encourages  all firms  to reduce  fluctuations  in employment.  Both  effects  raise  the average  level  of
employment  economy-wide  and reduce  the unemployment  rate. CondHitonal  on a given  structure  of
eligibility  and  benefits,  the  theory  suggests  that  experience-mrating  will  do  a better  job of achieving  the  goal
of stabilizing  employment  (will  reduce  the destabilizing  effects  of Ul benefits).
The  ideal  evidence  for this  proposition  would  be  a before-after  comparison  of the  impact
of imposing  experience-rating  on a system  whose  benefit  structure  remained  unchanged. No such
evidence  exists;  and we must rely on the rather  extensive  literature  that examines  the effects  of the
various  provisions  of experience-rated  financing  in  the U.S. The  difficulty  with  this restriction  is that we
cannot  tell how applicable  the results  are  to other  economies,  given  the institutional  and behavioral
dffferences.  All  we can  infer  is the impact  of marginal  changes  in the parameters  of states'  experience-
rated  tax structures.
Within  this very  narrow  framework  there  is a rapidly-growing  and now quite  convincing
body  of empirical  research.  The  strongest  evidence  is that  a lower  maximum  tax rat  or a lower  tax  rate
on employers  with negative  balances  in their accounts  increases  the incidence  of unemployment
(increases  fluctuations  in  employment).  Beyond  this,  there  is  some  slight  evidence  that  a higher  minimum
tax  rate,  and  thus  a higher  tax  on  firms  that  generate  little  or no  unemployment,  raisps  unemployment  and
increases  employment  fluctuations. A fair conclusion  from this literature  is that in general  more
experience-rating  does  reduce  employment  fluctuations  in  the  U.S.  This  suggests  that  imposing  a payroll26
tax that  Is at  least paitly  experence-rated on  a  Ul  system would  reduce its  costs  and  lower
unemployment,  but that particular  experiment  has never  been attempted.
Other Economic Impacts
All of the questions discussed In this Subsection involve  issues in both benets  and
inanoing. Moreover,  each relates  to the potential  non-labor  market goals of the Ul program that were
presented  In Section B.
Do Ul benefits  smooth consumption? This Issue  was for many years analyzed as one
of *benefit  adequacy,n  that Is, were the benefits  sufficient  to replace a large fraction of the reduction  in
family  income? This gets toward the consumption-smoothing  goal that was discussed  In  Section  B, but
I  is not directly on target.  A family might lose income as a result of a spell of unemployment  of one
family  member;  but  total consumption,  including  of goods produced  in the home,  may not change  or may
drop substantially.  To examine the sucCess  of Ul  in smoothing consumption one  must examine
consumption  directly. The Issue  Is the extent  to which Ul benefits  (and any changes In the shifted tax
burden that accompany  the payment of higher benefits)  loosen the liquidity constraint that may be
engendered  by the loss of income.
There is a large  literature  of studies  of benefit  adequacy. These  generally  find that other
labor-force  responses  do not suffice to make up the difference  between  the lost eamings and the Ul
benefits received  by the unemployed  worker.  Only one study (Hamormesh,  1982) has examined  the
extent  to which Ul benefits  loosen  the liquidity  constraint  facing unemployed  American  households. The
evidence  suggests  that roughly half of all benefts are spent In  a way  that suggests  the household  would
face a drop In  consumption  without them. Applying  the resuits  to other countries,  the longer duration of
benefits  suggests that they accomplish even  more In  this regard (since households  presumably  face a
more svere  liquidity crunch the longer a member  has been unemployed).
This discusslon Ignores the Impact of the provision of publicly-funded Ul benefits on
private  saving. Without  Ul individuals  would accumulate  precautionary  savings  to cover  spending during27
spells of unemployment. To some extent Ul will displace  some amount of this saving. We might thus
find that Ul benefits  appear  to overcome  liquldity  constraints,  even  though those constraints  would not
exist if there were no Ul program. There has been no empirical  analysis  of this Issue. It does Imply,
though, that the empirical evidence  provides  an upper bound on the efficacy  of Ul In meeting  the goal
of consumption-smoothing.
Does Ul stabilize  the macroeconomv?  The discussions  of the stabilization  effects  of Ul
all dealt with tho behavior  of Indidual  agents. Keynesian  macroeconomics  argues that the automatic
increase  In benefit payments  that accompanies  cyclical  declines  In product demand will at least  partly
maintain  consumer  spending and lessen the reduction In aggregate  demand.  This assumes  that the
taxes used to finance Ul do not change along with benefits  to reduce  their Impact. This suggests  that
in a long recession any countercyclical  effect of benefits  will be offset somewhat by experience-rated
financing,  as taxes are Increased  based on recent Increases  In benefit payments. In the framework  of
more general macroeconomic  theory any Impact of the Ul system on spending wIll be lessened. To
some extent fluctuations  In aggregate  spending will be reduced by changes In  the money market;  and
some of the effects will be offset by workers' and employers' responses  to their expectations  of the
changes  that generate  the Increase  In unemployment.
A  strand  of  empirical wo*  from  the  1960s through  early 1980s examined the
countercyclical  Impact of the Ul program. The best Inference  trom this literature  I  that the American
program reduced  the magnitude  of cyclical  fluctuations  of GNP by no more than 10 percent,  an efet
that may even have diminished  during the 1980s  (Dunson  et al, 1991). The Impact may be somewhat
larger In European  programs  that offer more generous  replacement  and longer potential  duration. Both
Inferences,  though, !gnore  the possibility  that the program displaces  private savings (see  above) that
would to some extent mitigate fluctuations  In GDP as unemployed  workers dissave  to maintain  their
consumption. Taking all this together, it Is reasonable  to Infer  that Ul programs  are not very Important
In  mitigating cyclical  fluctuations  In  spending,  and  presumably in  unemployment too.  Any28
macroeconomic  Impacts  are likely  to be small,  suggesting  that the goal  of cyclical  stabilizatlon  should
not be central  In considering  whether  or what  type  of U! program  to adopt.
Do  Ul  oroarams  redistribute  incomes?  In  groping  toward  a partial  answer  to this  question,
make  the apparently  reasonable  assumption  that benefits  by themselves  equalize  the distribution  of
income. Indeed,  the best evidence  on this issue (for example,  Ehrenberg  et al, 1978)  is based  on
comparisons  of the  distributlon  of Ul benefits  and  household  Incomes.  The  studies  suggest  that  they  do
not go to households  in the lowest  two deciles,  but are  most  heavily  concentrated  in households  with
Income  at or somewhat  below  the median.
Beyond  this assumption,  the  answer  to the question  Is  tied up with  all the  Issues  of tax
Incidence  that wwro  crucial  In answering  questions  In the previous  Subsections.  The  answer  Is more
complex  for an experience-rated  program,  since  there  Is greater  opportunity  for sorting  of workers  by
propensiy  to become  unemployed.  Regardless  of whether  experience-rating  is used,  we can  be  fairly
confident  that a lower  limit  on the tax base,  other  things  equal,  reduces  the ability  of the program  to
redistribute  Income.  Obversely,  lower  maximum  benefits,  and longer  potential  duration  (since  low-wage
workers  tend  to be unemployed  longeo  strengthen  the redistributive  effects.
Does  a Ui oroaram  affect  GDP  jW  shifting  resources  away  from  their  most  efficient  uses?
The  theoretical  argument  here  Is  that the program  subsidizes  risky  actMiMes  and leads  to their  relative
expansion.  This  will be  true to the extent  the financing  Is not perfectly  experience-rated  among  firms.
At the margin  resources  are diverted  from their  best uses,  so that total output Is reduced. Some
simulatlons  have  attempted  to measure  the size  of the  reduction.  Not  surprisingly  given  the  small  scope
of the program,  the loss  is a tiny  fraction  of GDP. Nonetheless,  there  clearly  is some  reduction.
Gneral Conclusions
A consideration  of the  evidence  on  this  very  diverse  set  of economic  issues  leads  to some
Interesting  overall  conclusions.  If the  program  is perfectly  experience-rated  and  workers  and employers
on  average  have  unbiased  expectations  about  the  risks  of unemployment  and  save  accordingly,  the only29
ffect of Ul Is to substituto  payroll taxation of worker'  eamings for their private savings. There Is no
chango in the level of employment or  n its fluctuatons.  Tho only net Impaot is a reduction in the
aggregate rat  of private savings. If private savings  did not suffice to avoid liuidity  problems during
some workers' spells of unemployment,  economic  welfare  may be raised. It is a matter  of trading off  the
gains  trom allowing somr unemployed  worker  to reduce  the fluctuations  In thoir consumption  against
the costs to society  of the reduction  in private saving.
In the real-wold cases  of imperfect  xperience-ating, as in the United States,  or no
experience-rating,  as in other developed countries,  additional economic Impacts arise. There Is more
scopeo  for rodistributing  Income, with the direction of the redistribution  dependent on the structure of
benefits  and limits on the tax base.  However,  introducing such a Ul program Increases  the extent of
fluctuations in employment, and, by making labor a relatively  more expensivo  input Into production,
blases  employers  toward moro capital-intensivotechniques.  Offering  Ul benefits  aids  an economy  chiefly
by maintaining  spending  of households  that contain  unemployed  workers. The  costs of helping  worker
who would become unemployed even In the absence of a  Ul program are reductions in average
employment  and In GDP, and the additional  unemployment  that the Ul program Induces  when shocks
to product demand occur.
E. Transferrina Ul Proar*ms to Develoolng  Econome_s
This Section  highlights  those areas  where  differences  In labor-market  structure  between
developed  and developing  economies  could lead  to differences  in how one might structure  Ul programs
In them. Rather  than going through all the goals  and features  listed in Sections  B and C, the discusslon
Is organized  around our knowledge  of the behavioral  differences  between  the two types of economie
that might be Important  for Ul. Since  this Is  designed  to be a broadly applicable  guide, It Ignores  specif
institutional  problems  that must be accounted  for when  constructing  a Ul program In  a particular  country.
While  very few developing  economies  have Ul programs,  they are not unknown. As of
1983,  Barbados,  Bolivia,  Chile, Cyprus, Ecuador,  Egypt,  Ghana,  Mauritania,  Mauritlus  and Panama  had30
some sort of Ul program (ISSA,  1983; ILO, 1988). A detailed  comparison of the provislons  of these
progmrms  to those of Ul systems  In OECD  countris that were discussed  in Section  C Is not Informative;
but a gnemal comparison between  the two groups of countries  points out some Interesting  dierences
and similarities. In decreas-.g order of thoir starkness,  these are:
*  Ul systems in developing countries are more likely to rely on shared
employerAworker  financing of benefits.
*  Potential  duratlon of bonefits  Is generally  shorter.
*  Waiting periods are more likely.
*  Programs rarely  cover govemment  workers.
X  Net replacement  rates  are about the same.
Obviously  a major,  indeed  a defining  difference  between  labor  markets in developed  and
developing  economies  is the absence of industrialization  in the latter.  Instead, there are large urban
trdiftonal  sectors characterized by  casual employment and very small-scale and often short-lived
operations,  with the modern  sector  being relatively  small,  and with  both dwarfed  by traditional  agriculture.
Even  these essential,  but very broad differences  offer some guidelines  for structuring  Ul
programs. Given  the small size of establishments,  their rapid  tumover, and the lack  of standard record-
keeping,  covering  urban traditional  employees  seems  undesirable.  Similarly,  covering  small  firms is likely
to be diflicuit administratively;  and their ubiquity and high failure rates suggest  that offering benefts to
their former employees  would add tremendously  to the costs of a Ul program. Taken  together, these
consierations  suggest that coverage  be llmited to firms above some size threshold  that have been In
opoeation  for some period of  Ume.  At least  one year's operation  should be  required;  and perhaps  a lower
llmit of 10 employees  should be necessary  for coverage  of a fOrm's  workers.
In the theoretical  analysis  of developing  labor markets the major contribution  has been
the model of economic dualitm.  An essential  characteristic  of this model is the assumption  that the
supply of  labor to  enterprises  In the modem sector Is perfectly elastic (i.e., that  real wages, and
presumably also wages relative  to traditional Industry are rigid).  The source of this rigidity may be31
behavioral,  stemming  from the payment  of profit-maximizing  efficiency  wages by modem-sector
employers.  Or t  may be Institutional,  arising  from  spillovers  trom  wage-setng  in  the  govemment  sector,
or trom pressures  by govemment-supported  labor organizations. Whie wage rigidity may not
characterize  all developing  countries  (for  examples,  the NICe  of East  Asia),  it Is  a potentially  Important
characteristic  of many  of them. It provides  an Important  structural/behavioral  distinction  between  them
and developed  countries  (Fields,  1987).
In order  to see  how  recognizing  the  existence  of labor-market  dualism  should  affect  how
we  structure  Ul programs,  it Is  worthwvhile  examining  briefly  the Impact  of Ul on  wages  and  employment.
(This  Is  just a formalization  of the discussion  In Section  D.) Figures  Ia and lb depict  a labor  market
under  the assumption  (which  was  Implicit  throughout  Section  D)  that real  wages  are  flexible. In both
figures  the initial  equilibrium  Is shown  by the Intersections  of S and D.  In Figure  la a payroll  tax Is
imposed  on employers.  If there  Is  no response  by  workers  to the Ul benefits  financed  by this tax,  the
only  effect  Is  a drop In  the real  wage  paid  to the intersection  of S with  the new  labor-demand  curve,  D,
and a slight drop In employment  to ic.  The supply  curve  Is drawn  as nearly  vertical,  reilecting  the
discussion  In Section  D, and leading  to the conclusion  that  the tax is bome  by labor.
Labor  supply  will,  though,  be  affected  by  the creation  of a system  of Ul benefits,  for  they
make  participation  in the labor  force  more  attractive.  This  leads  to a rightward  shift In supply,  to S, a
further  decrease  in the real  wage  paid,  but an Increase  In employment.  (This  Is  the effect  discussed  In
Section  D under  Question  4.)  Whether  or not E, exceeds  Eo  depends  on the magnitude  of workers'
responses  to the insurance  the program  offers.
If  the  tax  Is  Imposed  on  workers'  eamings  rather  than  on  employers'  payrolls,  as  In  Figure
lb, the effects  on  wages  received  are  similar.  The  real  wage  paid  rises,  as supply  Is  reduced  trom  S to
S; but  the  net  wage  falls,  since  the  vertical  distance  between  S and  S exceeds  the  rise  In  the equilibrium
wage  paid. if, as Is likely,  workers  respond  to the benefits  that the tax finances  by increasing  their
willingness  to assume  the risk  of labor-force  participation,  supply  Increases  trom  S, perhaps  back  to S'-uo  o33
(equals  S In  the  Figure).  The  real  wage  pald,  and  the  net  wage,  are  decreased  further.  Employment  rises
above  i,  perhaps  back  to E, (equals  EJ).
These  are  standard  results  In the theory  of tax Incidence.  The  only novelty  Is  the fllip
added  by allowing  supply  to respond  to the existence  of the Ul benefts  that are financed  by the tax
whose  Incidonce  Is  being  analyzed.  The  results  depend  crucially  on the assumption  of fledble  wages.
They  show  that the nominal  payor  of the  tax that  finances  the program  has  no important  Impact  on its
eventual  burden.
The  Invariance  of the  wage  burden  to the  choice  of how  to assess  the  tax no  longer  holds
if real  wages  are  rigid (for  example,  due  to labor-market  dualism).  Consider  a labor  market  described
by Figures  2a and  2b, with  Initial  equilibrium  in  the modem  sector  at the constant  real  wage  paid,  wth
employment  at E,o,  and  with  the  urban  labor  force  at Lo.  (This  means  that  the  fraction  unemployed  before
a self-financing  Ul system  is created  is [LO-EJ/Lo.)  What  are  the effects  of financing  a Ul system  by a
payroll  tax? In that case  (as  in Figure  la) the demand  for labor  Is reduced  to D.  Because  wages  are
rigid,  the only effect  is on employment,  which  drops  to E,. If rural  workers  are  aware  of the  availability
of Ul beneft, the  supply  of labor  to the urban  sector  shifts  outward  to S, just as In Figure  la.  The  net
result  Is  a decline  In urban  modem  employment,  and  a rise  in  the urban  unemployment  rat  (in  the size
of the urban  traditional  sector). These  are  not desirable  outcomes.
These  outcomes  need  not  arise  In  a self-financing  Ul system.  If Ul benefits  are  financed
by a tax on eamings,  as in  Figure  2b, there  is no  reduction  in labor  demand.  Instead,  and as In Figure
Ib, the  supply  of labor  shifts  lefiward  (to S) in response  to the  tax. If,  as seems  reasonable,  urban  and
rural  workers  are  aware  that  the  tax finances  Ul benefits  that  on average  equal  total  taxes,  the net  effect
is to shift  the supply  of labor  to the urban  area  back  to S (equals  S). In this  case  there  is no net  Impact
on either  employment  or urban  unemployment.
The same  results  hold in a dynamic  model  that explicitly  accounts  for rural-urban
migraton  (e.g.,  Harris  and  Todaro,  1970).  In equilibrium  the  unemployment  rate  is  an  increasing  function84
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of the size ot the difference  In net incomes  between  the modem sector  and the rural  area and of th  rate
of growth of productivity  In  the modem sector,  and  a decreasing  function  of the  rate of growth of modem-
sector product demand.  If the tax Is assessed on employers, but urban works  are eligible for Ul
benefits,  the Initial  effect Is  to Increase  the rato of rural-urban  migration. In equilibrium  the result are  the
same as In Figure  la, except  that the dynamic  model tells us in aaditlon that the urban sector will grow.
If the tax Is assessed  on workers' earnings,  there is no net effect  on the size  of the urban sector, just as
there Is no impact on employment  or the unemployment  rate.
This analysis demonstrates  that, to the extent we believe that labor-market  dualism
characterizes  developing  economies,  Ul benefits  should be  financed  by taxes  on the eamings  of workers
in the modem sector.  Unless  this Is done, the Ul program will reduce modern-sctor  employment,
Increase  the  size  of the urban  traditlonal  sector,  and stimulate  rural-urban  migration. Unlike  in economies
where  we are sure  that real  wages  are flexible,  the choice  between  parties  on which to assess  the tax  that
finances  Ul benefits matters  crucially  N real  wages are rigid.
The discussions  In Sections  B and D made  it clear  that the best justification  for Ul Is its
role as  insurance that allows households to stabilize consumption.  Whether this goal is a better
justification in  developing countries depends on two  Issues:  ()  For a  given uninsured loss of
consumption,  Is the resulting  loss In utility greater  In developing  countries? (ii) Is the lost consumpton
that is insured  against greater (in percentage  terms)? Consider each of these Issues  In tum.
The Impact of the lost income on the unemployed  household's  utility depends  on two
things. First, was  the household  able to save  during good times, I.e.,  to self-insure  against  the potential
loss In consumption  that might occur during a spell of unemployment?  There is no evidence,  or even
intuition,  to suggest whether modem-sector  workers in developing  economies  are more or less  able to
save. Second, if there is a shortfall  of savings,  and consumption  were to drop if Ul benefits  wore not
received,  what is the loss In the household's well-being? Assuming, as seems reasonable,  that the
household in the developing economy starts with a lower living standard than its developed-country
counterpart,  the issue Is whether relative  risk aversion  - the percentage  Increase  In utility in response36
to a given pecentage gain - Increases  or decroases  with Income. Here  the intuition and theoretical
discussion (e.g., Arrow, 1971) provide some guide, suggesting  that relative  risk aversion is probably
Increasing. This implies  that a given percentage  drop In consumption  is more burdensome  the higher
the initial consumption.  By itsef, this Inference  suggests less of a justification  for Ul as consumption
insurance  in dewvoping  countris  than elsewhere.
Income losses  among unemployed  workers  are unlikelv  to be equal In developed  and
developing  economies. In  the former unemployment  rates  are usually  quite low, so that the duration of
unemployment Is not very long in most cases.  In the latter urban unemployment rates are huge,
suggesting  that  the odds of finding another  high-paying  modem-sector  job are low. With a much larger
loss in income,  the utility loss from the decline  in consumption  Is larger In developing  countries,  so long
as workers  are no lOeS  myopic than  their counterparts  elsewhere.  These  considerations  suggest  that Ul
is at least as well justified as consumption  Insurance  In developing  countres as elsewhere.
The existence of  higher unemployment rates In developing countries (or, viewed
differently,  the relatively  large urban traditlonal  sectors) suggests  that tie  optimal net replacement  rate
and potential  duration may differ from developed  economies  because  the disincentive  effects  on job-
seeking may diffet.  The evidence In Section D suggested that the disincentive effects of higher
replacement  diminish  with the duration  of  the spell of unemployment.  Together  with the assumpffon  that
the duration  of unemployment  (of  employment  outside  the modem  secto  Is  very  long, this suggests  that
the disincentive  effects  of higher replacement  or longer potential duratlon will be small In developing
econombs.
Before  one draws  the obvious Inference  that net replacement  should be quite high In Ut
programs, rather than roughly the same as In the few developing countries that already have Ul
programs, some economic and poitical consideratlons  are In order.  First, the justification for Ul as
maintaining  consumptlon  diminishes  as the replacement  rate Is increased,  since at least  some of  the lost
consumption  should have been insured  against. Second,  paying a relatively  high Ul benefit  over  a long
potential  duration poses the political  problem  of creating a visible  class of reatively (to urban tradional37
employment)  high-income areom who are nonproductive. Taken  together,  these points suggest  that
while narrow economic  considorations  argue  for high net  replacement  and long potential  duration,  other
consildrations sugget  these be kept lower  and shorter.
The Impacts  of Ul on the level  of economic  actvity and on  the distribution  of net Incomes
will difr  from what the discu3sion In Section D predicted, n we assume that the labor market Is
charactwized by rigid wages (as In Figure 2).  if the system Is  inanced by a  tax on eamings, as
recommended  above, thee  Is no impact on resource  allocation  across  sectors, since  the relative  costs
of labor to paricular  ctors are unchanged. The Incidence  of the costs and benefit  of the system  are
entirely  on labor, so that the distributional  Impact of a Ul system  Is easier to trace than if wages were
flexible. I the earnings  tax is proportional,  or proportional up to a ceiling,  and If net replacement  rates
are constant up to a maximum  benefit  that is related  to the ceiling  on the eamings  tax, the direction  of
the Impact  depends  solely  on the correlation  of  the probability  of being unemployed  wih the household's
Income (among households in the modem secto".  Making the  reasonable assumption that this
correlation  Is negative,  we may Infer  that such  a Ul system  would equalize  net Incomes  within  the modem
sector.
nf  we maintain  the assumption  of rigid real  wages, but finance  the Ul system by a payroll
tax, the implicatons about the ectoral Impacts  change somewhat. Assuming  that the supply of labor
to each  ctor  Is elsti  ovr  the relevant  range of employment,  failure  to epeience-mat  the tax will not
aiterthe mix of actvities across ectors.  Relative  labor  costs would be unaffctod  by sectoral  difrences
in the variabiity of employment. However,  experince-rating the payroll tax would lead employers  to
avoid laying off worker  when product demand drops, and would reduce the overall rate of urban
unemployment.  This would party  ofset  the shift In demand  in  Figure la  from D to D  and the
concomitant  reduction In modemn-sctor  unemployment. It Implies  that any payroll  tax used to finance
the Ul system  should be experence-rated.
Institutional  and behavior differnces  sugget  several miscellaneous  oonsiderations  In
tructuring Ul  programs In developing countrie.  Employment In the  gavenment  sector, or by38
government-owned  enterprises,  constitutes  a much  greater  proportioAi  of modem-sector  employment.
In many  cases  wage-seting  by the public  sector  spills  over Into private-sector  wage setting. A pay
increase  In  the  govemment  sector  will  aventually  raise  labor  costs  In  modem  private-sector  firms,  leading
to a reduction  In the amount  of labor  those  firms  demand,  and an increase  in costs  to the Ul system.
With  a Ul  system  the potential  Impacts  of govemment  wage  policy  expand,  and  the agency  In charge  of
the Ul system  must  take  the impact  of that policy  Into  account  In planning  its finances.
Many  developing  countries  lack  well-developed  postal  systems:  and the bureaucratic
apparatus  for paying  benefits  and  aiding  In  job search  does  not  exist  either.  This  offers  planners  a choice
about  how  to structure  the  physical  aspects  of paying  Ul benefits.  The  answer  seems  quite  clear: Pay
benefits  In person at an office that aids in job search. This requires  creating  an administrative
superstructure;  but such  a structure  Is  much  more  reliable,  and more  likely  to be  acceptable,  than  the
payment  of benefits  by mail.  The  use  of mail  payments  In OECD  countries  is a recent  development  that
grow  out of long  experience  with  payments  in person.
in  the  transition  to a newly  constructed,  self-financing  system,  every  planner  is  faced  with
a problem  of  when  to start  assessing  taxes  ano paying  benefits.  To avoid  using  govemment  contributions
to finance  benefits  during  the  phase-in  period,  payment  of benefits  could  be  delayed  for some  time  after
taxes  are  initially  assessed;  or, as  in  the  Unitod  States,  the  initial  tax  rates  can  be  set  high  enough  to allow
the fund  to build  for several  years. The  difficulty  with  the delay,  especially  if the taxes  are  on eamings
as was  recommended,  Is  that workers  are  unlikely  to wish  to be taxed  now  to fir2nce benefits  several
years  In the future,  given  high turnover  rates  in modem-sector  jobs. That  being  the case,  the more
desilble path  is to begin  assessing  taxes  and paying  benefits  simultaneously,  setting  an initial  tax rate
that is well  above  projected  benefit  payments.39
F. 8ome Sugae_tlons for ReseH  r
While  a compendium  of provisions  of Ul programs  In  developing  countris  exists (ISSA,
1983),  there has been no basic research  on the economics of these programs  that might bo useful  In
modifying  them and In structuring  programs  for other countries. The research  summarized  In Section  D
all Is from developed  economies. Studies from developing  countries are needed; but such research
should not merely  replicate  the myriad  studies  of microaconomic  behavior  In  the presence  of Ul programs
In developed countries.  Rather, it should aim toward providing answers to the theoretical questions
raised In Section  E that determine  the transferability  of what we have  leamed In developed  countrbies.
The Issue  underlying  the most Important  recommendation  In Section E Is  the existence
of labor-market  dualism. Clearly,  much effort has been devoted to studying this Issue  empiricaly.  It
should,  though, be examined  in the context  of Ul programs. If dualism  Is not Important,  and Ul programs
are  financed by  Imperfectly experience-rated  payroll taxes, we will  observe greater employment
fluctuations In covered Industries  than In otherwise similar uncovered  employment. The question, of
course, Is  what Is  7otherwise  similar." A study that can answer  the questions  would use Industry  data on
employment  and output In  several  developing  countries  that have  Ul systems,  and  compare  employment-
output elasticities  there to those from similar  industries  In carefully  chosen  developing  countries  that do
not offer Ul.  Essentially,  pairwise  comparisons  of elsiticitles by Industry  should be examined.
If we find that the elasticitles  are higher In covered industries compared to the same
Industries In countries wthout  Ul,  we can  infer that  labor markets In countries with  Ul  are not
characterized  by dualism, at least  for the purposes of analyzing  the Impact of Ul.  Alternatively,  if we
cannot discem any difference  between elastickles,  we may Infer that the Ul program does not alter
employment  pattems,  perhaps  because  real  wages are Indeed rigid. That Information  should be useful
in determining  the appropriate structure  of Ul programs In developing  countries, as it tells us whether
Figure 1 or Figure  2 Is more appropriate.
The other major Issues In Section E were the transferability  of the goal of maintaining
consumption,  and the appropriate  potential  duratlon  of benefts and the net replacement  rate. Studying40
thee  requires  teaming  how providing  Ul beneflts  affects  consumption  pattems  and unemployment
duration. Again,  an ideal  approach  would Involve  palmiwse  comparisons  between  carefully  chosen
developing  countries,  with  one  in  each  pair  having  a Ul  system  and  the  other  not. This  affords  a test  that
is  Impossible  in  advanced  countries,  since  no potential  comparison  group  (that  does  not  offer  Ul)  exists.
While  some  budget  studies  have  been  conducted  on  households  In  developing  countrios,
none  has  focussed  on  adjustments  that  are  made  In  response  to unemployment  (or  to an  Involuntary  shift
from modem  to traditional  employment)  of a household  member. Longitudinal  diary data on the
expenditures  of a large  sample  of households  can be used  to Infer  how consumption  responds  to a
period  of unemployment,  or to a permanent  shift  into  or out of the modem  sector. Moreover,  by using
the  same  quetionnaire  In otherwise  similar  countries  that  do or do not  offer  Ul benefits,  their  Impact  on
pattems  of adjustment  of consumption  can  be  Inferred.  If we  find  no  differences  In  pattems  of adjustment
between  pairs  of countries,  we can  infer  that households  in the country  offering  Ul are sufficiently  far-
sighted  to smooth  consumption  in response  to the expectation  of unemployment.  Obversely,  greater
smoothing  in  the  country  offering  Ul provides  a good  justification  for offering  benefits  as a way  of easing
the hardships  facing  myopic  or liquldity-constrained  households.
A similar  set of sampling  frames  should  be used  to Infer  how  benefits  affect  job-finding.
During  the  past  15  years  labor  economists  have  inreasingly  relied  on  the  distincton  between  incidence
and duation to analyze  unemployment Unfortunately,  we have lIttle Information  from developing
economies  that would  enable  us to apply  this very  fruitful  dichotomy. Discovering  what pattems  of
unemployment  and nonemployment  duratlon  are  In  developing  countries,  and  then  comparing  the micro
data  across  matched  Ul-non-UI  countries,  is essential  for understanding  the  structure  of unemployment
In developing  countries  and how  Ul programs  might  affect  it differently  from  their  Impacts  In developed
labor  markets.41
0.  Conclusions
Unemployment  Is  a social  Insurance  program,  one  of  a class  that  provides  compensation
for lost  Income  by requiring  Individuals  and/or  employers  to pay  taxes  Into  a common  fund. It Is  part  of
a general  safety  net  that ckizens  of developed  countries  have  built up around  themselves.  It Is  unique
among  wich programs,  in that ft offers  payment  for an event  that Is partly  preventable  and that Is not
physically  painful. It thus differs  from old-age  and disability  Insurance,  fom  compensation  for work-
related  Injury  and  Illness,  and  others.  This  exposes  it to greater  crP.iclsm  from  citizens  who  are  opposed
to any social  Insurance;  and these  characteristics  Impose  on planners  who construct  Ul programs  an
obligation  to take  them  Into  account.
This  study  has  considered  In  detail  the  various  goals  that  have  been  adduced  for Ul  and
tried  to distinguish  which  make  sense.  In some  cases  the  goals  run  counter  to what  Ul  programs  actually
do; but one goal - the provision  of consumption  Insurance  - Is at least  partly  met by typical Ul
programs  in developed  countries. Part  of the paper  outilned  In detail  the parameters  of a typical  Ul
program  and their  ranges  in Industrialized  countries.  The  evidence  on the economic  Impact  of these
parameters  should  provide  planners  with  a basis  for choice  that can guide  them in constructing  Ul
programs  elsewhere.
Experience  and evidence  In  developed  economies  may  carry  over  into  LDCs,  but  we  just
do not know. Several  characteristics  of developing  economies,  particularly  the possibility  that labor-
market  dualism  Is Important,  suggest  the need  for care  in constructing  Ul programs  there. In order  to
provide  the evidence  necessary  for this effort,  this study  suggests  several  lines  of research  that can
answer  questions  about  the validity  of the  consumption-insurance  goal  in  developing  countries  and  the
appropriate  structures  of taxes  and benefits.
As nations  develop  their  industrial  sectors  Ul becomes  an increasingly  attractive  policy
option. Developing  countries  are  fortunate  in having  the experience  and  evaluations  of Ul programs  In
developed  economies.  Thoughl  each  country  must  account  for the unique  aspects  of its labor  market,42
and  though  tho  infbmton  gleaned  about  Ul  In developed  ooonomies  Is  not  fully  transferable,  it  Is  at least
somewhat  instue.
Nothing  has  been  said  about  the possibility  of constructing  Ul programs  In the  formorly
planned  economIes  of Eastern  Europe.  The  program  outline  presented  In Section  C Is  as useful  there
as In developing  countries.  But  the discussions  In Section  E about  dualism  and  the size  of the modem
ector  are  hardly  apptlcable.  What  I  appropriate  Is  absolutely  unclear  at this point,  sInce  the eventual
nature  of the  more  basic  economi institutions  that  will  arise  Is  unknown.  Nonetheless,  the  evidence  from
Wetem counties  can  still  proide guidelines  for choosing  program  parameters;  and the  discussion  of
program  goals  should  forco  people  who  make  policy  to think  about  their  expectations  for any  Ul  program
that is proposed.43
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